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In framing a government which is to be administered by men

over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.
-James Madison'
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, statutes like the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)2 and its state equivalents appear to help the governed "oblige" the

* B.A. Michigan State University, 1993; candidate for J.D. Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington, 1996.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
2. Freedom of Information Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
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government. 3 In essence, freedom of information statutes restrict govern-

mental power by forcing administrative agencies to disclose potentially
damaging information.4 The purpose of the federal freedom of information
statute "is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed." 5 Thus, the statute provides an
opportunity for the citizenry to "oblige" at least part of the government to
control itself.
6
Although the federal and state freedom of information statutes

provide a meaningful check against corruption in administrative agencies,
the statutes contain a fatal flaw: generally, they do not subject the
legislative branch to their provisions.7 Ironically, while legislators serve

3. See Claudia Rast, Case Note, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 363, 369 n.33 (1985) (listing
all of the fifty states' freedom of information statutes and suggesting that most follow the
federal FOIA model).
4. See generally Amolsch & Madden, Inc. v. FTC, 591 F.2d 809 (1978).
5. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
6. Also referred to as "Sunshine Acts" or "Public Records Acts."
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). See generally ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975 & Supp.
1995); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1985 &
Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-2804 (Michie 1992); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6253 (West
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-203 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 1-19 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10003 (1974 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1522 (1981 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 119.01 (1995); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-18-70 (1994); HAW. REv. STAT. § 92F-11 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 9-338 (1990); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 140/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE 35-14-3-1 (1989 & West
Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-218 (1993);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.872 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993 & Supp. 1994); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 44:31 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 10-612
(1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (Law. Co-op 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15.231 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 25-61-5 (1972 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966
& Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1994); NEv. REv. STAT. § 239.010 (Michie
1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:A4 (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West
1989 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (Michie 1995); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 87 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-04-18 (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.420 (1991); 65
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 661 (1959 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2 (1990 &
Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.021 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2102 (1953 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 315 (1985 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 3.1-341 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42. 17.260 (West 1991 & Supp.
1995); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-2 (1995); Wis. STAT. § 19.31 (1986); WYo. STAT. § 16-4201 (1977 & Supp. 1995).
Maine and Montana are the only states that subject the legislature to their Public
Records Acts. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 301 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-
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as the actual "governors" of the country, they are not susceptible to checks
from the other branches. Further, legislators compose the branch that most
comprehensively represents the will of the people. That they are not subject
to the provisions of the FOIA constitutes a perverse shortcoming in the
scope of many freedom of information statutes. State ex rel. Masariu v.
Marion Superior Court,' a recent Indiana Supreme Court decision, best
illustrates this shortcoming.
When members of the Indiana House of Representatives debated and
voted on controversial amendments to the state budget, the legislative clerk,
without explanation, denied access to a record of the roll call votes to
reporters from the IndianapolisStar. Although the members' votes flashed
on an electronic board in the House Chamber, a momentary glimpse did
not allow the reporters to mentally record how each representative voted.
In the subsequent lawsuit, the IndianapolisStar argued that the records of
the roll call votes were "public" pursuant to the Indiana Access to Public
Records Act. 9 The newspaper argued that the public had a right to know
how its representatives cast their votes, particularly in a vote about issues
concerning how the General Assembly intends to allocate taxpayer monies.
In a one-page decision, the Indiana Supreme Court disagreed. The
court held that any judicial involvement in such a matter constituted a
violation of the separation of powers clause of the Indiana Constitution. Or,
as the court explained it: "If the legislature wishes to authorize sanctions
against itself upon a claim by press or public alleging improper legislative
secrecy, such sanctions would have to be determined and imposed solely
by the legislative branch itself, without recourse to the courts."' 10 In
essence, the court handed the legislative branch a virtually unrestricted
license to engage in legislative secrecy.
Because most freedom of information statutes fail to cover the
legislative branch, constituents at both the state and federal levels are not
legally entitled to know how their representatives have voted. Consequently, when members of a legislature, such as the Indiana General Assembly,
wish to protect themselves from the backlash of a politically unpopular
vote, they can do so without sanction. Of course, legislatures do not
regularly hide their voting records in an archive far from public view.
However, without the inclusion of voting records in freedom of information

101 (1995). Florida has amended its constitution to include the legislative branch. FLA.
STAT. art. I, § 24.
8. Masariu, 621 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1993).
9. Act of Jan. 1, 1984, No. 19, § 6, 1983 Ind. Acts 241, 253 (codified as amended
at IND. CODE § 5-14-3-1 (1989 & West Supp. 1994)).
10. Masariu, 621 N.E.2d at 1098.
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statutes, the potential exists for legislative secrecy. The electorate cannot
assert a legally enforceable right to access voting and other records which
symbolize exactly the type of information individuals in a democratic state
should be able to access. The absence of access to such records undermines
the core of a representative government.
This Note asserts that the legislative exemptions from the FOIA are
fundamentally inappropriate in a democratic society and should be
eliminated at both the state and federal levels. Part I of this Note sets forth
the development of freedom of information statutes and demonstrates that
the purpose and legacy of these statutes remain unfulfilled. It also discusses
basic policy considerations that weigh in favor of extending the scope of
freedom of information acts to include the legislative branch. Part H
demonstrates that at the state level, the judiciary could require disclosure
of voting records. It employs the Masariu decision and the Indiana Access
to Public Records Act to illustrate that inclusion of the legislative branch
does not transgress constitutional principles. Part Ill focuses on legislative
reform at the federal level and the problematic issue of creating an effective
enforcement mechanism.
THE UNFULFILLED LEGACY OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

I.
A.

Historical Underpinnings

The predecessor to the FOIA originated in 1958, when Congress
amended a 1789 "housekeeping" statute that gave federal agencies the right
to regulate their business and to keep records." That statute had been
relied upon "as authority to withhold certain types of information from the
public." 2 As a result, the one-sentence amendment provided: "This
section does not authorize withholding information from the public or
limiting the availability of records to the public."' 3 Thus, as far back as
1958, there was an articulated effort to discourage governmental secrecy
and promote disclosure of the records of administrative and executive
officials. However, Congress did not design the 1958 amendment to
confront the emergence of massive administrative agencies, and the original
FOIA evolved as an amendment to Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946.1" The FOIA became necessary when functional

11.
Sess. 2
12.
13.
14.

H.R. 2767, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d
(1972).
H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 11, at 2.
H.R. 2767, supra note 11.
H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 11, at 2.
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inadequacies in Section 3 gave rise to loopholes that prevented disclosure,"5 and agencies continued to randomly deny information to the
public. 16
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the FOIA into law on July 4,
1966. The Act has been lauded as milestone legislation because it provided
access to information that agencies had long prevented the public from
seeing. 7 In his bill-signing statement, President Johnson remarked:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles:
A democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be
able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be
revealed without injury to the public interest."
The FOIA required disclosure of agency documents and demanded that
agencies and courts liberally construe all provisions in favor of disclosure.
Agencies trying to avoid disclosure had to satisfy one of nine narrowly
drawn exceptions.19 States that subsequently enacted freedom of information legislation seemed to follow Congress's lead by exempting the legislature.

B.

Freedom of Information Statutes Fail in Principle

Freedom of information statutes uphold the principle that an informed
electorate is one of the keys to a successful democracy.21 However, once
the legislative exemption is taken into account, this principle loses much of
its meaning. At the federal level, at least, the legislative branch is explicitly
exempted.' Citizens are not fully "informed" when they are denied
access to information about the decisions of their representatives. At least
one member of Congress has argued that the statutes appropriately cover
only appointed officials, because elected representatives remain accountable
to the public at election time.' However, this argument actually favors
extension of the statutes to elected officials and exposes the absurdity of the

15. Id.
16. See HAROLD L. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow (1953). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 11, at 2.
18. Statement by the President upon Signing the "Freedom of Information Act," 316
PuB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).

19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1994).
20. See sources cited supra note 7.
21. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242 (1978); 139 CONG. REC.
S17,056 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1993) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-Vt.)).

22. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A) (1994).

23. 137 CONG. REc. H10,811 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Rep. Wise (D-

W. Va.)).
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statutes' failure to cover the legislative branch.
The only direct authority the people retain in a representative
democracy is the chance to vote for or against elected officials. However,
citizens cannot cast informed votes if they are denied access to the very
records that enable them to evaluate their representatives. In addition,
human nature and recent scandals committed by representatives demonstrate
that elected officials are as capable of secrecy and poor decision making as
are unelected officials. Therefore, to ensure the people's ability to cast an
informed vote, it is just as important, if not more important, for the public
to have access to the decisions of elected officials. Because of the
legislative exemption, the statutes represent a disingenuous attempt to
"ensure an informed citizenry" and fail to provide a meaningful opportunity for the "governed" to hold the elected "governors" accountable.24
One can argue, however, that information about the legislative
branches is sufficiently available. For instance, debates on the floors of
most state legislatures are open to the general public. Votes are eventually
published in legislative journals. 5 Most congressional proceedings are
televised, and anything that is not published is often leaked to the public.
These arguments are unconvincing because, in principle, the legislative
exemption offends basic democratic ideals. At the core of representative
government lies the concept that representatives are answerable to their
constituents. As a matter of principle, the legislative exemption from
freedom of information statutes legally debases the public's right to know
how its interests are represented.
C.

Public Policy Considerations

The fundamental failure of most freedom of information statutes to
honor the stated purpose of the legislation provides a compelling reason for
legislatures throughout the nation to eliminate the legislative exemption. As
a matter of general public policy, there are several additional reasons.
First, the efficacy of representative government not only depends on
an informed electorate but also on an electorate that actively participates in
the democratic process. Currently, less than half of all adults typically vote

24. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 242.
25. However, legislative clerks often have substantial periods of time before they must
publish the legislative journals. For example, in Arkansas the legislative clerk has up to six
months to publish the general assembly's legislative journal. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-18-204
(Michie 1992). In Delaware, the clerk has two years. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 905
(1974).
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in elections.' Although there are multiple reasons for voter apathy, one
significant factor is the inability of voters to access objective information
about candidates.' In the past, candidates developed a bond with their
constituents by using merely their "voting records and walking shoes, " '
whereas now, voters have a substantially more difficult time judging an
incumbent's decisions. Instead, voters are barraged with negative campaign
techniques that obscure the candidates' substantive platforms. If voters are
truly motivated, they can go to the legislative clerk to examine the
legislative journal; however, those journals are not frequently updated.29
This problem is compounded by the media's tendency to superficially
address actual issues and focus on the "game dimension" of politics.3"
Ultimately, the electorate is not given the opportunity to judge
incumbents solely on the basis of their voting records. While it is important
for voters to have exposure to facets of candidates beyond their voting
records, in some ways, a voter's knowledge of a candidate's voting record
is all that is needed to cast an informed vote. Currently, access to a
candidate's voting record is too cumbersome. To institute a meaningful
opportunity for the electorate to participate in the political process,
legislators could, first, include themselves and most of their records within
the scope of freedom of information statutes, and, second, take the spirit
of "open government" a step further by publishing their voting records
daily on the Internet.3
The failure of the legislative branch to subject itself to the same
disclosure requirements as faced by the executive branch is problematic for
other reasons. The exemption diminishes the trustworthiness and overall
stature of the legislature as a respectable governing body. Fr instance,
voters already have a general mistrust of their representatives' motives,32

26. Mark D. Uebling, All-American Apathy, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 1991, at 30,

30.
27. See generally Jeff Greenfield, The PressRuined PresidentialCampaigns... and
Other Dubious Assumptions about the Media and Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 54 (reviewing THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER: HOW THE DECLINE OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GROWING POWER OF THE NEWS MEDIA UNDERMINE THE

AMERICAN WAY OF ELECTING PRESIDENTS (1993)).
28. Kathryn Johnson, Why So Many Lawmakers Are Calling It Quits, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 25, 1980, at 43, 44.
29. See sources cited supra note 7.
30. Greenfield, supra note 27, at 55.
31. This proposal was first considered with the Electronic Freedom of Information
Improvement Act of 1994, an amendment to the FOIA, but it did not materialize. 140
CONG. REc. S12,726 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1994).
32. James T. O'Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Congress: An
Explorative Analysis and Proposal,31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (1994).
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and most are not even aware that the legislature has exempted itself from
statutory disclosure requirements. 3 Upon discovery of this, the average
voter reacts with "surprise or disgust." 34 It follows that the legislative
exemption would fuel further mistrust of the legislative branch if the public
understood that they do not have a legally enforceable right to access the
voting records of representatives.
Additionally, the omission of the legislative branch from the FOIA
has upset the balance of power between the branches. Because of the
exemption, legislative bodies are untouchable. While the executive branch
is subject to legislative inquiries for documents, it cannot in turn check the
secrecy within the legislative branch. For instance, pursuant to Rule 76 of
the Indiana Rules for the Government of the House of Representatives, the
legislative clerk is required to make an original and three duplicates of any
vote taken by the recording equipment. One of these duplicates is to be
earmarked for the use of the media. 6 Yet, when a legislative clerk
violated this rule, the judiciary considered itself powerless to sanction the
behavior, deeming it an "internal function of the legislature." 37
For these reasons, the legislative branches must subject themselves to
the FOIA, at least with respect to their voting records. Until this reform
occurs, it is a misnomer to call the statutes "freedom of information" acts.
The following sections propose a potential judicial response at the state
level and a legislative approach at the federal level to remedy the problems
posed in Masariu.
II.

STATE JUDICIAL REFORM

In contrast to the federal level, the states possess some leeway for
judicial intervention on behalf of voters' rights to access voting records.3
In Indiana, for example, the Access to Public Records Act does not
specifically exclude the General Assembly but defines a public agency as
"[a]ny ... instrumentality or authority by whatever name designated,
exercising any part of the executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative
power of the state."39 Although the Masariu court did not choose to

33. 137 CONG. REC. E4018 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of then Rep. English
(D-Okla.) quoting then President Bush).
34. O'Reilly, supra note 32, at 416.
35. ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF INDIANA, RULES FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE HOUSE 16 (1991) [hereinafter HOUSE RULES].
36. Id.
37. State ex rel. Masariu v. Marion Super. Ct., 621 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 1993).
38. See sources cited supra note 7.
39. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-2 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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interpret Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-2 in this way, a court in Florida did
attempt this reading, albeit unsuccessfully. Florida had a statute analogous
to Indiana's in that the definition of "agency" was not restricted to any
particular branch, and this statute was interpreted by the Florida court to
include Florida's General Assembly.'
Whether the right to voting records can pass constitutional muster
depends on the court's interpretation of the statute. Part II (A) of this Note
argues that state courts could interpret freedom of information statutes to
include the legislative branch. Because courts would engage in statutory
interpretation, there is not a separation of powers issue contrary to the
holding in Masariu. In addition, Part II (B) addresses the Speech or Debate
Clause arguments raised by subjecting the legislative branch's voting
records to a freedom of information statute.

A.

Separation of Powers Principles

It is a well-established concept that separation of powers concerns are
only triggered when one branch usurps the functions of another branch.41
In most cases, the judicial entity would be merely construing a statute the
legislature passed. For instance, instead of deciding the case on a declaratory writ, the Indiana Supreme Court could have remanded Masariu. By
using the "plain meaning" method of statutory interpretation, the court
could have found that Indiana Code Section 15-4-3-2 applied to the
legislature because on its face, the unambiguous language of the act clearly
applies to the legislative branch.42
Alternatively, the court still could find Ind. Code See. 15-4-3-2
applies to the legislative branch by employing a standard rule of statutory
interpretation which recognizes what a statute does not say is as important
as what it does say.43 In other words, if the Indiana General Assembly
really wanted to exclude itself, it could have unambiguously done so as
Congress did in the FOIA. Because courts are required to look to the
"general purpose of the statute, objects to be attained, and evil to be

40. Hawkes v. Locke, 559 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 595 So. 2d
32 (Fla. 1992). Subsequently, the Florida legislature formally amended Florida's Public
Records Act to include the legislative branch. Consequently, Florida voters now can rely

on the state's constitution to enforce their right to view voting records. FLA. CONST., art.
I, § 24.
41. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61
U. Cm. L. REv. 123, 125 (1994); Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1988).
42. Henderlong Lumber Co. v. Zinn, 406 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ind.App. 1980) (holding
that a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the clear and unambiguous language

of a statute is not subject to judicial interpretation).
43. Van Orman v. State, 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Ind.App. 1981).
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remedied"" when interpreting an ambiguous provision, it follows that the
stated purpose of the FOIA includes the legislative branch. For instance,
the stated purpose of Indiana Code Section 5-14-3-1 is to protect the
public's right to "full and complete information regarding the affairs of
government and the official acts of those who representthem."45 Obviously, subjection of the legislative branch to the FOIA effectuates this end.
It is more difficult to prevail on the separation of powers argument as
the Indiana Supreme Court framed it. Since the court did not find that
Indiana's Access to Public Records Act applied to the legislative branch,
it concluded that any inquiry into the branch's internal management
constituted an impermissible invasion into the functions of the legislature.
While this argument is clearly meritorious, it is not persuasive.
The court's rigid view of separation of powers overlooks an important
point: separation of powers principles require only independence of the
branches, not supremacy of one branch over the others. Currently, as the
Masariu court noted, the legislative branch can engage in "legislative
secrecy" without any checks from the other branches, thus, rendering the
legislative branch supreme. Furthermore, recent separation of powers cases
such as Morrison v. Olson' have relaxed the distinct divisions between
branches. In Morrison, the United States Supreme Court held a branch
breaches separation of powers doctrine when it encroaches upon another
branch's "core functions."47 Following Morrison's lead, the Indiana
Supreme Court could have acknowledged that while the act of voting itself
is a "core function," the publication of voting records is not. As a matter
of constitutional law, while the publication of voting records is a legislative
function, it is not a core function and, therefore, is not constitutionally
protected from intrusions by the judicial branch.
B.

Speech or Debate Clause

The Speech or Debate Clause presents another constitutional question
with respect to the inclusion of voting records in a freedom of information
statute.' Although it was not a key issue in the Masariu decision, future
courts should consider the constitutional question more thoroughly. If
44. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pet Milk Co., 78 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ind. App. 1948)
(en banc).
45. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
46. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
47. Id. at 685.
48. "The [representatives] shall in all Cases ... be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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Congress and state legislatures subject themselves to freedom of information provisions, they may try to invoke the privilege more frequently. This
part of the Note demonstrates that the historical rationales and modem
interpretations of the speech or debate privilege do not validate the
legislative exemption from freedom of information statutes with respect to
voting records.
1.

Underlying Principles of Speech or Debate Clause

United States v. Johnson49 was one of the first United States
Supreme Court decisions that articulated the reason for the Speech or
Debate Clause. According to Johnson, fear of the Crown's attempts to
deter legislators from making objectionable statements about the Crown in
Parliament inspired creation of the clause. With the Crown's tyranny in
mind, the Court stated that the purpose of the clause was "to prevent
intimidation [of legislators] by the executive and accountability before a
possibly hostile judiciary."5" Other interpretations emphasized that an
ancillary goal of the privilege was to avoid the interruptions of legislators'
duties caused by a need to defend themselves in court. 1
Although both of these concerns are valid, they simply do not apply
to the disclosure of voting records through a freedom of information
statute. The "accountability" the Court refers to in Johnson does not mean
that the privilege completely prohibits judicial review of legislative
conduct. In fact, Kilbourn v. Thompson,52 the first case interpreting the
range of the privilege, still stands for the settled proposition that the Court
is periodically empowered to review legislative conduct. Thus, the freedom
the Framers seemed to envision for legislators was autonomy to represent
their constituents without the fear of being hauled into court for their
beliefs and comments, not absolute immunity from judicial review.
The Indiana General Assembly's ability to represent its constituents
is not inhibited by a judicial ruling that voting records are not protected by
the speech or debate privilege. For instance, in Masariu, the court did not
hold the legislators accountable. Instead, it held the legislative clerk
responsible, but only to the House leadership. 3 The legislators in the
Masariucase were not involved in the litigation and did not have to neglect
their legislative duties to defend their actions in court. Ultimately, a
requirement that the legislative clerk must disclose voting records pursuant
49. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 889 (1966).
50. Id. at 181.

51. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
52. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1881).
53. State ex reL Masariu v. Marion Super. Ct., 621 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 1993).
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to a freedom of information statute does not realistically threaten to control
the conduct of a legislator which, as Supreme Court precedent dictates,
must occur to invoke the speech or debate privilege.
The publication of voting records obviously occurs after the legislators
have completed the legislative process. However, there still is an indirect
impingement upon legislative communications. One could argue that the
essence of the speech or debate privilege still bars inclusion of voting
records in the FOIA. The legislators' awareness that voters are guaranteed
instant access to voting records could "chill" debate and their ability to
vote freely. This is comparable to a court holding legislators accountable
for what they have done or said during the legislative process, which is
clearly contrary to the speech or debate privilege.
This argument, however, is immaterial from the standpoints of both
the speech or debate privilege and public policy. The Speech or Debate
Clause does not altogether restrict intimidation of legislators. Rather, the
privilege was narrowly designed to protect legislators from intimidation by
the other branches, not by voters. While voters have no similar mandate as
to the judiciary, they have a public mandate to hold legislators accountable
for their actions. Voters are supposed to pressure legislators with the threat
of voting against them. Therefore, the argument that instantaneous
availability of voting records could "chill" the legislative process is not a
meritorious use of the speech or debate analysis.
Secondly, reminding legislators of their obligation to their constituencies is consistent with public policy goals. A legislator's awareness of voter
access to voting records does not impinge on legislative voting strategies,
but instead encourages a higher quality of work. If the legislators involved
in the vote in Masariu knew that the IndianapolisStar reporters could gain
instantaneous access to voting records, it is more likely that the legislators
would attend and cast an informed vote. Immediately, they would be forced
to defend their decisions about the expenditure of taxpayer monies rather
than abstain from a vote or cast a vote they know their constituents do not
support. This incentive is lost when legislators can prevent reporters and
the public from accessing voting records.
2.

Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause

Clearly, Masariu does not present the dangers the Speech or Debate
Clause was designed to resist. Despite this, it is still necessary to consider
whether current case law defining the practical scope of the privilege
extends to the publication of voting records. Most of the analogous United
States Supreme Court decisions address the question of whether the Speech
or Debate Clause protects legislators and their aides in the context of
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criminal or ethical breaches of the law. The cases are still germane to
questions about voting records because they all adopt a more or less
uniform definition of the Speech or Debate Clause.
Literally, the clause only provides for the protection of "Senators and
Representatives,"' which technically should suggest that legislative clerks
cannot invoke the privilege. However, the Supreme Court has enlarged the
scope of immunity to include legislative employees and aides in limited
circumstances.' Generally, the Speech or Debate Clause treats members
and aides "as one."5 6 If a legislative act is protected when a legislator
performs it, that member's aide vicariously enjoys protectionY
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not limited the speech or debate
privilege to comments made during the course of debates on the House
floors. The Court has consistently interpreted the clause to include acts
within the sphere of legislative activity.58 As the Court in Powell v.
McCorack 9 explained:
it would be a 'narrow view' to confine the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate. Committee
reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered, as
are 'things generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it. ' 60
Although the Court has not limited the clause to in-house debates,
subsequent decisions still intimate that the Court would not extend the
privilege to the publication of voting records or to the voting records
themselves. In several decisions, the Court emphasized the principle that
the clause does not protect "all things in any way related to the legislative
process." 61 The Court voiced concern that a broad reading of the speech
or debate privilege would invite legislators to find a way to relate virtually
everything they do to the legislative process.62 Consequently, the Court
has upheld inquiries into activities that are incidentally related to the
legislative process (e.g., the publication of voting records) but not into
activities that represent core legislative functions.
Thus, as framed by Supreme Court precedent, the central question in
Masariu becomes whether the publication of voting records is a core

54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, ci. 1.
55. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
56. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902

(1972).
57. Id. at 618.
58. Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).

59. Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
60. Id. at 502 (emphasis added) (quoting Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (1881)).
61. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).

62. Id.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

legislative function as opposed to only relating incidentally to the legislative
process. If the publication of voting records is not a core function, then the
legislative clerk in Masariu cannot claim speech or debate protection.
Gravel v. United States63 is the seminal case defining "core function." In
that case, Senator Gravel claimed that his speech or debate privilege should
also immunize his aide from testifying in a federal grand jury proceeding. 6' Senator Gravel argued his aide should be protected for his assistance to Gravel as he prepared for and conducted a committee hearing, and
when the aide facilitated the Senator's desire to privately publish confidential government documents. 65 In this decision, the Court drew a bright line
between protected and unprotected legislative activity.
According to the Court, a protected legislative act is one that is "an
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation. . . ."I
Therefore, the aide's involvement with the committee was protected from
grand jury inquiry because committee hearings are integral to the legislative
process.67 Conversely, the aide's role in private publication of the
documents was not protected from inquiry because publication is not
inherently part of the legislative process.68 Furthermore, the Court found
that distribution of information to the public did not constitute an "integral
part of the deliberative and communicative process." 6 9
Although the Gravel facts are distinguishable from those of Masariu,
there is no question that according to the Court's analysis, publication of
the voting records is not part of the legislative process. Rather, voting
records represent the ex post facto outcome of the legislative process. In
another case, the Court upheld the general rule that the publication and
distribution of materials constitutes a nonlegislative function.70
One could argue that although the publication of records is incidental
to the legislative process, voting records themselves constitute a deliberative document, thus, commanding speech or debate protection. However,
this argument also fails. In general, a deliberative document is one that
reflects the "give and take" of the thought processes of legislators. 7'

63. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
64. Id. at 625-28.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 609.
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 616.
Id.

70. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
71. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Voting records do not indicate why legislators voted the way they did, but
show merely how they voted.
IH.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Over the past several years, Congress has begun to realize the need
to subject itself to the laws it passes. As vaguely noted in one bill, "It is
the sense of the Congress that Congress... should govern itself according
to the laws that apply to the private sector and the other branches of the
Federal Government." 2 In fact, during the first session of the 103d
Congress, no fewer than seven bills were proposed that would make the
FOIA apply to both houses of Congress.' In 1995, Congress passed the
Congressional Accountability Act,74 subjecting Congress to many of the
employment laws that apply to the private sector.7 5
Congress's attempts to rein itself in are encouraging, but the reforms
do not address the issue of enforcement. For instance, the Congressional
Accountability Act uses an internal enforcement unit, the Office of
Compliance, that is educational in nature.76 Yet, acts that appoint
legislators to monitor other legislators are not much different from the
status quo. For example, as Masariu illustrates, internal controls are
meaningless when the legislature decides not to enforce them. 7 In terms
of access to voting records, it is essential for the legislative branch to
concede enforcement to one of the other branches. Thus, in contrast to
current practice, Part m demonstrates that subjecting the legislative branch
to executive branch enforcement does not violate separation of powers
principles.

A.

Separation of Powers Principlesand Enforcement of the FOIA

In his article, Applying Federal Open Government Laws to Congress,
Professor James T. O'Reilly states that executive enforcement of freedom
of information statutes against the legislative branch poses constitutional
problems.7' Relying on cases such as INS v. Chadha79 and Bowsher v.

72. H.R. Con. Res. 18, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
73. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Legislative Update, THE NEWS
MEDIA & THE LAW, Spring 1994, at 2, 4.
74. Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, § 301, 109 Stat. 3
(1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1381 (1995)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 301 (West
1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-101 (1995).
75. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24.
76. 2 U.S.C. § 1381 (1995).
77. The Indiana General Assembly's legislative clerks are subject to a rule that requires
them to distribute copies of voting records to the media. HOUSE RULES, supranote 35.
78. O'Reilly, supra note 32, at 417.
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Synar, ° he correctly argues that members of the legislative branch cannot
retain legislative oversight of the execution of a law and cannot wield any
executive powers. 8 ' In order to ameliorate this enforcement problem,
O'Reilly supports the use of a board of directors for the Office of2
Compliance that would consist of nonexecutive branch members.
Members of the board would have only the power to mediate disputes,
much like an ombudsman, and would not enforce freedom of information
against the legislative branch.'
While O'Reilly's proposal is constitutionally sound, it overlooks a
more aggressive approach to enforcement that is also constitutionally
feasible. Cases such as Chadha and Bowsher merely stand for the general
separation of powers rule that the legislative branch cannot reserve
legislative power over the executive once a law has been passed. They do
not speak to the issue of whether the legislative branch can subject itself
willingly to executive enforcement of a freedom of information statute.
The underlying purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to
prevent any one branch of government from aggrandizing its power by
assuming functions of another. In particular, the Framers were concerned
that the legislature would overreach its power.' In fact, some argue that
the Framers tried to create not only a strong executive, but one that was
strong enough to "counteract overreaching legislatures. "'
Another integral part of the separation of powers principle is that the
Framers never intended for the three branches to work in isolation. Instead,
as James Madison wrote, separation of powers does not mean that "these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts
of each other."' Instead, constitutional principles are compromised when
"the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department ....
With these underlying principles of separation of powers in mind, it
becomes clear that Congress can subject itself to the FOIA without
appointment of legislative members to manage enforcement. By amending

79. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80. Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
81. O'Reilly, supra note 32, at 418-19.
82. Id. at 419.

83. Id. at 420.

84. 137 CONG. REc. H10,810-06, H10,811 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of

Rep. Wise (D-W.Va.)).
85. Greene, supra note 41, at 125.
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981)
(emphasis omitted).
87. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the FOIA to include itself, Congress would not usurp the power of another
branch but instead would voluntarily relinquish it. Furthermore, by doing
so, each branch would exercise its constitutionally assigned function.
Surely, it is not against separation of powers principles for the executive
branch to implement a law that the legislature passed. The fact that the
executive branch could be "intrusively involved" with the affairs of the
legislature does not present a separation of powers obstacle, as long as the
legislature authorizes the intrusion.
The current approach to a more fluid distribution of branch functions
further supports this analysis. Cases such as Mistretta v. United States"8
have broadened separation of powers principles by allowing branches to
delegate some of their functions to other branches. For instance, in
Mistretta, the Supreme Court permitted Congress to delegate some of its
law-making power to members of the judiciary.8 9 It went so far as to say
that separation of powers principles "do not prevent Congress from
obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches."' Moreover, most
administrative agencies exercise functions originally entrusted to all three
of the branches.91
In light of the diffusion of branch functions within the contemporary
government structure, it is apparent that, if it so desired, Congress could
subject itself to the FOIA and appoint the executive branch to enforce it.
Consequently, any claim that separation of powers principles compel
Congress to have its own internal enforcement mechanism amounts to a
legislative subterfuge. As one congressman admitted, "whenever Congress
appears to be in jeopardy of [a] Justice Department [investigation] ... we
all of a sudden find separation of powers."'
CONCLUSION

In Florida, voters felt so strongly about legislative coverage, 80
percent of them approved a referendum to amend Florida's Public Records
Law and eliminate the legislative exemption.' If the reaction of Florida's

88. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. Id. at 371-74.
90. Id. at 372.
91. John Devlin, Toward a State ConstitutionalAnalysis of Allocation of Powers:
Legislators and Legislative Appointees PerformingAdministrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1205 (1993) (explaining "administrative agencies typically exercise all three types of
powers ....

").

92. 136 CoNG. REC. H5618, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Walker (R-Pa.)).
93. FloridaVoters PassReferendumExpandingState PublicRecordsLaw, NEWS MEDIA
& THE LAW, Winter 1993, at 14.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

voters is representative of the general public's sentiments, the legislative
exemption is clearly illegitimate. As the voters in Florida must have
realized, forcing the legislative branch to subject voting records in
particular, to freedom of information statutes provides voters with all of the
power they need to hold legislators accountable for their actions and voting
patterns.
The potential for the public to take charge in the political arena is
uncomplicated and unlimited. If voting records were published on-line
pursuant to a provision in a freedom of information statute, or readily
available to the media, voters could easily keep tabs on their representatives
and, thereby, sidestep the need to pay attention to negative campaign
advertisements or inane sound bites. Voters should have the legally
enforceable option to demand this level of involvement from their
representatives.
The first step toward creating this "superaccountability" is to amend
freedom of information statutes to include legislative branches. Until the
legislative exemption is abolished, the legislative branches will retain the
option to exercise their statutorily protected right to engage in legislative
secrecy. Ultimately, voters must "oblige" the legislative branch to disclose
its voting records by abolishing the legislative exemption to freedom of
information statutes.

